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David Willetts: The Pinch. How the baby boomers took 
their children’s future – and why they should give it back
Reviewed by Raphaelle Schwarzberg
avid Willetts’ book The Pinch
could have hardly been published
more timely. The context of the
current euro-zone crisis over debt manage-
ment and the election of David Cameron to
the oﬃce of Prime Minister in the United
Kingdom, based on a programme of deficit
reduction, have all drawn attention to the
alleged excesses of older generations. As sug-
gested by the subtitle, How the baby boomers
took their children’s future - and why they
should give it back, the aim of the book is to
explain the dues of diﬀerent generations
since the Second World War from a per-
spective of intergenerational cooperation
and equity. This appears to be a novel justi-
fication for public policy, but it remains to
be discussed how justified or convincing his
argumentation is.
The main thesis of the book reads as follows:
as a very large generation, the baby boomers
(individuals born between 1945 and 1965)
have benefited from an exceptional situa-
tion. However, that position does and will
impose strains on the younger generations’
well-being, a situation that is unfair. Not
only do the baby boomers dominate cultu-
rally, through their power as an extremely
large consumption market, but they also
have concentrated extravagant amounts of
wealth and property in the UK. According
to Willetts, they own £3.5 trillion of the we-
alth of the country out of a total of £6.7 tril-
lion (p. 76). They have mismanaged these
assets, for example by a lack of savings in the
private sector and unscrupulous investment
in the housing bubble. This behaviour has
limited the younger generations’ capacity to
acquire and accumulate. Soon, baby boo-
mers could be imposing their political and
economic agendas, especially with respect to
pensions and health care spending through
democratic votes. Gerontocracy would pe-
nalize the youngest by favouring state redis-
tribution towards seniors. Quoted by
Willetts, projections based on data by the
HM Treasury indicate that age-related spen-
ding would increase by £60 billion in today’s
money, that is a 4.9 percentage points in-
crease of 2007/08 GDP within forty years
(p.164). In other terms, according to the
HM Treasury: “The share of age-related
spending is therefore projected to increase
from around half of total government spen-
ding in 2007-08 to around 60 per cent by
2057-58.” (p. 39) These figures remain
much below those of other European coun-
tries such as France of Germany (p. 41).
Still, such a growth of public spending could
only be met by raising further taxes accor-
ding to Willetts: “That would mean tax in-
creases just to carry on delivering
programmes which don’t change to a popu-
lation which does. This is a heavy burden for
the young generation to bear as they go
through their working lives” (p. 165). Based
on a 2004-publication by Hills, the baby
boomers are expected to receive 18 percent
more from the welfare state than they have
contributed (p. 162). 
What Willetts considers the appropriate
level of intergenerational transfers and the
main arguments supporting such transfers
are explored in chapter 5 ‘The Social Con-
tract’, through both concepts of direct and
indirect reciprocity between three generati-
ons: grandparents, parents and children. In
that chapter, Willetts provides a three-fold
support for transfers between generations.
These three accounts of intergenerational ju-
stice are, however, not always compatible
and consistent with each other, especially
given their justifications and implications.
The first is a naturalized account of coope-
ration with biological arguments (neurobio-
logy, Dawkins’ selfish gene). The second
models cooperation between rational and
self-interested agents (game theory). The
third is a watered-down Rawlsian contrac-
tualist theory. Willetts concludes his reaso-
ning by underlining the centrality of the
family to uphold such transfers, thereby
echoing the first chapter (discussed below).
Around this main argument, Willetts dis-
cusses the reasons why the boomers became
such an unprecedented generation, inclu-
ding: ultra-individualism, the permissiveness
of society, the deregulation of the labour
market that allowed access to women and
foreigners. The result of these changes is,
 according to him, an increasingly wasteful
disposal of society’s resources. The transfor-
mation of the family structure (i.e. ever
smaller households) has also resulted in
more inequality. Increased investment in fa-
mily ties, including more time devoted to
infants but not adolescents, runs parallel
with the decline in civic participation, a si-
tuation that Willetts greatly deplores follo-
wing authors like Robert D. Putnam. In
chapter 10, Willetts considers that the de-
crease of social mobility fosters social ine-
quality. Schooling segregation and the
importance of “soft skills” restrain the op-
portunities of the most disadvantaged.
Changing admission rules, providing ade-
quate training and more information are the
solutions envisaged by the author. Accession
to the housing market by younger generati-
ons has also been particularly diﬃcult with
the housing boom, which has left them re-
paying extravagant mortgages (chapter 11).
In addition to the financial and investment
mistakes committed by the boomers, Wil-
letts recognizes that other factors also explain
the diﬃculties faced by the younger genera-
tions including greater competition on the
labour market (resulting from globalisation)
and low inflation rates. The age segregation
at each stage of life would also have preven-
ted the baby boomers from realising the dif-
ficulties that the younger generations
D
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encounter.
Willetts also discusses the environmental
challenges (chapter 7) facing the not-so di-
stant future generations. There, the author’s
aim is to make the reader aware of the ne-
cessity to adopt a more adequate social dis-
count rate so as to value the future better.
This is particularly crucial because future ge-
nerations will not necessarily be as well oﬀ or
even better oﬀ than current generations
given the economic and scientific uncer-
tainties awaiting them within the next forty
years. 
Willetts’ eminent political position, formerly
as Shadow Minister for Universities and
Skills and now Minister of State for Univer-
sities and Science in the UK governement,
will undoubtedly participate into bringing
to the fore of the public debate the issues of
intergenerational justice. The richness of
sources, the variety of disciplines and themes
referred to provide the reader with cutting-
edge academic research. We will now try to
address the following problematic questions:
1) What are the baby boomers responsible
for? 
2) What issues of fairness and equality has
the accession of women to the labour market
raised? 
3) What role does ‘British uniqueness’ play
in Willetts’ argumentation?
4) How does Willetts ground intergenera-
tional obligations?
1) What are the baby boomers responsible
for?
According to Willetts, “The charge is that
the boomers have been guilty of a monu-
mental failure to protect the interests of
 future generations.” (p. xv) However the re-
sponsibility of the boomers in this failure is
not always clear from the book. Baby boo-
mers are sometimes accused of having taken
advantage of their position because of selfish
behaviour or of belonging to a very large ge-
neration that will thus necessarily dominate
smaller generations. They are also conside-
red as capable of abusing their power in the
future through gerontocratic behaviour. Al-
ternatively, the bad luck of more recent ge-
nerations is sometimes attributed to the
policies chosen by and benefiting the baby
boomers or to the lack of awareness of the
baby boomers with regards to the diﬃculties
facing younger generations because of age
segregation. The extent to which baby boo-
mers are obligated to younger generations
should reflect on how baby boomers can be
considered responsible for the position the
younger generations is in. However, this is a
discussion Willetts shies away from.
The responsibility of the baby boomers is
hinted at by Willetts when he discusses lack
of private savings (p. 80), unreasonable hou-
sing investment (pp. 80 and 255) and the
use of financial instruments (pp. 144-5)
which are not based on the ‘real’ economy.
“We have either borrowed against the house
already or we expect to finance our retire-
ment by borrowing against it in future. And
where does this money that we thought we
had come from? From our children.” (p. 80)
Studies on a selection of European countries
suggest that the determinants of private sa-
vings are multiple, positively aﬀected by
“changes in dependency ratio, old-age de-
pendency ratio, government budget con-
straint, growth of real disposable income,
real interest rate and inflation and negatively
by the liquidity constraint. The results sug-
gest that deregulation of capital markets re-
sulted in a decrease of private saving while
the existing financial pressure on social se-
curity systems resulted in an increase of pri-
vate saving” (Hondroyiannis, 2006: 565).
Thus, while Willetts seems vindicated in that
the deregulation of capital markets is nega-
tively associated with lower savings, such po-
licies are not just a matter of individual
behaviour but also of responsible policy ma-
king. The focus of Willetts’ book is, however,
purely centred on the baby boomers as indi-
viduals. Such a criticism also applies to Wil-
letts’ take on the financial markets, which
are now known to have  lacked suﬃcient re-
gulation to avoid numerous malpractices.
Second, baby boomers may not be purely
short-sighted. Studies such as that of Hon-
droyiannis (2006) observe a positive corre-
lation between demographic factors (aging)
and private savings. This eﬀect needs to be
discussed for the most recent years for the
UK. Third, Willetts suggests that the hou-
sing boom was crucial in the reduction of sa-
vings, thereby imperilling the future of
coming generations: “The rise in asset prices
in the last past decade made us feel richer
but it favoured the possessors, the baby boo-
mers. (…) This delivered a temporary boost
in their living standards financed by a mas-
sive reduction in saving and imposed higher
costs on the next generation, who have less
to inherit. It will be the younger generation
who pay the price” (p. 255). It remains to be
outlined by Willetts the extent to which the
housing boom was limited to specific well-
oﬀ sections of the baby boomers and the
level to which they are the main assets that
are transferred by the baby boomers to their
children. Transfers during the lifetime bet-
ween the generations remain to be assessed. 
The responsibility of the baby boomers is
however questioned by the argument that
‘large generations’ will automatically bene-
fit from their size. Firstly, it seems implausi-
ble to accuse the baby boomers of being a
large generation. They have not chosen to
belong to such a generation. Secondly, it re-
mains to be discussed whether large genera-
tions necessarily benefit from their size.
While the boomers are to receive 18 percent
more from the welfare state than they have
contributed to, the generation preceding the
boomers will have obtained between 15 to
22 percent more. Willetts defends the thesis
that large generations benefit from their size
per se through a model of hunters-gatherers
in a closed economy without possible pro-
ductivity gains for the younger generation.
These assumptions are, however, highly re-
strictive: an upsurge in the productivity of
the younger generations would allow them
to avoid the poverty they are doomed to in
Willetts’ model. Empirically, it remains to
be argued whether it is size or the con-
junction of a large number of economic fac-
tors that resulted in the current economic
position of the boomers. Accordingly, a
study by Slack and Jensen (2007: 729) on
the United States shows that “the odds of
underemployment to be greatest among
members of relatively large cohorts, net of
other significant predictors. The results also
show that the impact of relative cohort size
diﬀers by educational level, suggesting that
adverse economic conditions produced by
large cohort size can be oﬀset by broader
changes in the labor market and other social
institutions.” A similar analysis for the Uni-
ted Kingdom would prove most useful. As
shown by Chauvel (2010) the eﬀect of the
institutional setting (type of welfare state)
on the success of diﬀerent generations (for
example on the labour market) is important.
Finally, a theoretical discussion is needed to
assess the obligations of diﬀerent generati-
ons in the context of population change, a
question that Gosseries (2010) suggests
could be crucial. Thus, it is not even clear
that responsibility can be attributed where
the supposed culpable actions are not inten-
tional or simply determined.
Suggesting that the baby boomers could
abuse their position because of their demo-
graphic weight to their sole benefit as they
get older is premature. There is an impor-
tant academic debate on whether population
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aging leads to more favourable elderly-cen-
tred and elderly-intensive services. Following
Tepe and Vanhuysse (2009) it seems impor-
tant to distinguish the two ways in which
overall age-related spending can increase
when a large generation is retiring: “But
since population aging increases the ‘objec-
tive’ need for pension spending, even a go-
vernor who does not confront any electoral
pressures would also increase overall pension
spending because any pension system based
on open-ended statutory entitlements will,
ceteris paribus, lead to increased aggregate ex-
penditure as the number of older people
qualified to draw pensions increases. What
makes theories of gerontocracy noteworthy
is their prediction that population aging si-
gnificantly aﬀects the generosity of indivi-
dual pensions” [Emphasis in original] (p. 3).
At the European level, results are mixed:
Kohli (2010) considers that “the likelihood
of gerontocracy is low and support for the
public generational contract is still broad
among all age groups” (p. 184). On the
other hand, Bonoli and Hausermann (2010)
found that age was a good predictor of vo-
ting behaviour on intergenerational issues in
Switzerland and a study on Germany by
Wilkoszewski (2009) finds evidence that the
stage of the life cycle and age have a strong
eﬀect on support for public policies of trans-
fers and on altruism within the family, for
example between grandparents and grand-
children. Tepe and Vanhuysse’s study on 18
Western countries (2009) demonstrates that
while overall spending increases, per pensio-
ner generosity has frozen or hardly increa-
sed between 1980 and 2002, thereby giving
more credence to the ‘fiscal leakage’ hypo-
thesis. Retrenchment patterns have even
been witnessed between 1996 and 2002.
Thus, the most recent scientific evidence is
mixed and should temper the vision propo-
sed by Willetts of the “voting power” (p.
250) of this big cohort. At the same time,
the existence of a party for the rights of the
elderly, the Senior Citizens Party in the Uni-
ted-Kingdom founded in 2004, may warn
us that previous studies were not adapted to
describe the large demographic changes that
will occur within the next decades.
2) What issues of fairness and equality has
the accession of women to the labour mar-
ket raised?
According to Willetts, access to higher edu-
cation, especially for women, is an explana-
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tory factor for increasing social inequalities:
“The expansion of women’s educational op-
portunities and women’s earnings has ope-
ned up an even greater gap between the
well-oﬀ households and poor households.
The tendency for well-paid, well-educated
men and well-paid, well-educated women to
marry is one reason why we have a more
unequal and less mobile society. (…) No
one could possibly wish to reverse these new
opportunities for women. But it looks as if
increasing equality between the sexes has
meant increasing inequality between social
classes. Feminism has trumped egalitaria-
nism.” (p. 208). The newly acquired inde-
pendence of women is, according to
Willetts, imposing new costs on society.
Women no longer remain in unsatisfactory
relationships because of economic depen-
dency, so households become more fragile
(p. 42). In addition, due to their longer life
expectancy, women represent a larger share
of pension spending according to Willetts:
“Men get more per person from, for exam-
ple, the contributory state pension, but as
there are many fewer men than women pen-
sioners, the total pensions budget is still ske-
wed towards women - 62 per cent of
pension spending goes to women” (p. 159).
The study referred to by Willetts (Blanden,
Goodman, Gregg and Machin, 2002) ho-
wever, must be taken cautiously given that
gender diﬀerences are not explicitly the
main focus of their study. Daughters from
wealthy backgrounds have benefited from
access to higher education, thereby moving
their socio-economic status closer to that of
their parents. However, this only brought
these women to the level already attained by
men of wealthy backgrounds. What is ob-
served, according to a report by Bellamy and
Rake (2005) is that “there is now as much
economic inequality among women as bet-
ween women and men.” Framing the dis-
cussion as Willetts does implicitly makes
women the focus of criticism. The fact is
that the market had to undergo structural
change to become less unjust.
On the labour market, women are still at a
disadvantage with men, at all levels of the
income scale. In Britain, the wage gap for
women is on average of 24.6 percent (with
in the public sector in the tenth percentile a
wage gap of 21.3 percent and in the private
sector in the ninetieth percentile a wage gap
of 31.1 percent) (Arulampalam, Booth and
Bryan, 2007). It has been argued that they
still face a wage ceiling. Due to the still pre-
dominating model of gendered provision of
care, “[w]omen are seven times more likely
than men to be out of employment as a re-
sult of family responsibilities.” (Bellamy and
Rake, 2005). For the Fawcett Society,
“[p]overty in the UK has a female face.”
(Fawcett Society, 2010).
Although women may be living longer, they
are also at a much greater risk of old age po-
verty, as has been analysed by Falkingham
and Rake (2000). The gender wage gap im-
plies that they have much lower earning pro-
files over their working lives. Their working
patterns are interrupted more frequently due
to the gendered duties of care, with sub-
stantial impact on their pensions. They often
work in activities with fewer occupational
pensions. Finally, their longevity renders
them more vulnerable to the erosion,
through inflation, of the pension’s value.
Willetts’ book unfortunately does not re-
cognise the diﬃculties and challenges faced
by women. The opposition of women to the
poorer classes seems unfair.
3) What role does ‘British uniqueness’ play
in Willetts’ argumentation?
In the first chapter, Willetts draws out the
specificity and long-standing pre-modern
features of the English family structure as
nuclear families. Such features include: con-
sensual marriage, low fertility, inegalitarian
inheritance and early departure of the chil-
dren for training. Claiming that such a
model existed since the thirteenth century,
we are unfortunately only provided with se-
venteenth century evidence. Although Wil-
letts claims such traits are unique to British
society, it is well-documented that similar
patterns existed in the Low Countries and
possibly spread at a later date to other coun-
tries in northwestern Europe. Though Wil-
letts gives quiet acknowledgement of this, he
fails to appropriately temper his subsequent
claims. Seventeenth century figures clearly
show a similar low fertility rate and late age
at marriage across many Western European
areas (Voth and Voigtlaender, 2008). With
respect to inheritance, will analysis of the se-
venteenth century seems to indicate that,
even if the nobility still practised this inega-
litarian division of inheritance, this was not
necessarily the case for craftsmen or indivi-
duals in mercantile activities (Ben-Amos,
2008). 
The specificity of this family structure is
used by Willetts to make several bold claims
about the British economy and society both
today and in the past such as: the greater li-
kelihood to trade and barter, greater mobi-
lity, the greater reliance on institutions such
as the guilds or civic institutions, the pro-
motion of liberal political institutions or the
development of financial services. These
claims are problematic, as Willetts does not
explain why the ‘acquisitive’ individuals for-
ming households and contracting on the la-
bour markets, supported by national
government and law, would need to rely on
communal institutions. In addition to the
necessity to diﬀerentiate between guilds,
clubs and civil networks, which did not have
the same purposes and probably not the
same influence on households, it is useful to
remember that guilds membership was li-
mited to a small number of people. Finan-
cial services were also certainly not invented
in the United Kingdom, and were not very
extensive by the thirteenth century. Banking
techniques were highly developed in Italy
where the family structure was, as ack-
nowledged by Willetts, diﬀerent. The possi-
ble mechanisms between family structures
and economic growth are still unclear and it
is problematic to argue that they were the
main underlying reason for the Industrial
Revolution. The exceptionality of the Eng-
lish economic features before the industrial
revolution are much debated, especially in
comparative work with the Netherlands
(Van Zanden, 2002) , the latter being called
the “first modern economy” by De Vries and
Van der Woude. Finally, the positive eﬀect
of the family structure in Britain onto its
economy is then hastily applied to the eco-
nomic position of what Willetts calls the
Anglosphere in today’s world.
Overall, the first chapter on Britishness and
the distinctiveness of the economic and so-
cial structure of this society will undoub-
tedly appear to the reader as politically
motivated claims. Published during an elec-
tion campaign, the book seems to be aiming
at providing a certain vision of Britain. Loo-
sely related with the discussion on the baby
boomers, it does not explain why smaller fa-
milies proved beneficial in the pre-modern
era and are now the source of a wasteful use
of resources. In absence of clear criteria and
descriptive mechanisms, the testability of
such claims is impossible.
4) How does Willetts ground intergenera-
tional obligations?
One of Willetts’ principal aims is to moti-
vate an intuitive understanding of the need
for justice between generations. However,
there are many hurdles in his use of so many
Intergenerational Justice Review
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diﬀerent theories to appeal to intergenera-
tional justice. With respect to game theore-
tical models (pp. 93-6), they have been
shown to not always be an adequate foun-
dation for cooperation between rational
agents. On the contrary, the rational strategy
can be defection, as exemplified in the pri-
soner’s dilemma. While some of these game
theoretical models (such as repetitive games)
can under certain conditions explain how
agents arrive at self-enforcing contracts and
reputation eﬀects, we can only imagine such
games with overlapping age groups, a consi-
derable restriction to their application. In-
deed, such models require enforcement
mechanisms which are not available to non-
overlapping generations. With respect to
Rawls’ theory, it is worth noticing that
Rawls’ position changed on how to appro-
priately envisage the original position in the
intergenerational context. In the model
where he considers that the representatives
“should care about the well-being of those
in the next generations”, he clearly states
that “it is not necessary to think of the par-
ties as heads of families, although I shall ge-
nerally follow this interpretation.” (1971,
p.128) Willetts’ claim about the centrality
of the family to ground intergenerational ju-
stice through use of a Rawlsian analysis is
thus problematic. Furthermore, in Justice as
Fairness: A Restatement, Rawls (2001) clari-
fies his theory towards the impartiality of the
moral agent: “The correct principle, then, is
one the members of any generation (and so
all generations) would adopt as the princi-
ple they would want preceding generations
to have followed, no matter how far back in
time.” (p. 160). Willetts’ literal understan-
ding of “heads of households” is an unfair
reflection of Rawls’ heuristic usage.
Willetts shuﬄes a very large number of dis-
ciplines and distinct theories, providing the
reader with a lively and original account of
the economic and social situation we find
ourselves in today. Not an academic work, de-
spite extensive reference to the most up-to-
date literature, the presence of the political
man behind the nib can be easily detected.
One may regret that the precision and rigour
of the argument’s gist is sometimes lost to elo-
quence and verve, but that will appeal to the
reader who does not wish to read the austere
studies underpinning this work. We will now
have high expectations about how Willetts in-
tends to resolve all such challenges in his new
position of Minister for Universities and Sci-
ence in the United Kingdom government.
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énérations Equitables represents a
very welcome francophone perspec-
tive on the topic of intergeneratio-
nal justice. The context of an aging European
population, consisting largely of baby boo-
mers, coupled with the threat of climate
change, appears as the general backdrop of
the book, bringing such issues to the fore in
the political and academic debate. The arti-
cles, from philosophers, economists, demo-
graphers and jurists, broadly fall within three
main areas of focus. One is concerned with
the theoretical challenges of intergenerational
justice, a field dominated by the work of
Rawls. Another centres around environmen-
tal aﬀairs and cultural heritage discussed
through case studies both from legal and eco-
nomics perspectives. The third analyses the
consequences of demographic changes, and
more specifically population aging, on inter-
generational social policy, with a greater focus
on current pensions schemes. This very wide-
ranging topic thus benefits from being consi-
dered by a large array of disciplines and from
diﬀerent and complementing angles. While
the articles have clearly not been made avai-
lable to the authors before publication, this
could be a blessing in disguise for the reader;
the independence of each of these articles
makes divisions and conflicting opinions
more salient.
The article by Professor Van Parijs presents a
large number of theoretical issues also discus-
sed in the articles concerned with intergene-
rational social policy. To examine the
demands of intergenerational justice Van Pa-
rijs considers first, justice between cohorts
and thus the question of “just heritage” and
second, justice between age groups as envisa-
ged through the question of “just transfers”. A
non-utilitarian, Van Parijs is of the opinion
that justice is not aiming at the maximisation
of the well-being or happiness of individuals
but to ensure “to all as much as possible (…)
the rights and means allowing them to pursue
the realization of their conception of what a
successful life is” (p. 42). His conception of
justice relies on the “lexicographic maximin”.
It follows that the heritage that a cohort
should leave to the next is not one in which
the latter receives exactly the same stock of
natural resources but one in which it inherits
a “productive potential” at least as high as the
one the former generation had received. It is
thus indispensable that generations invest suf-
ficiently and foster technical progress to pre-
serve the productive potential necessary for
the future to be in a position to “promote the
real liberty of the least well-oﬀ within itself”
(p. 49).
With respect to justice among age groups,
Van Parijs underlines that two major diﬃcul-
ties in the theory of commutative justice are
that it does not specify any minimal level of
transfer and is sensitive to life expectancy in a
counter-intuitive way. Van Parijs seems to be
more favourable to indirect reciprocity. If the
productive potential increases or decreases for
an age group, the surplus or the deficit should
be proportionally born by all, under the con-
straint of maintaining subsistence for all. The
solution to the current pension system crisis
resulting from demographic change lies in the
increase of the productive potential for the fu-
ture generation such as partly financing pen-
sions through capitalization, but also greater
investments in infrastructures, R&D and trai-
ning. In his conclusion, Van Parjis suggests
that a coexistence of the demands of interge-
nerational justice between cohorts and bet-
ween age groups implies “an obligation of the
financing of a basic pension at the appropriate
normative level” (p. 59). Thus, “[w]hat mat-
ters from the perspective of justice, is the ab-
solute level of basic revenue in each age group
and the potential left for each cohort of adults
to the next so as to fulfil its obligations.” He
can consequently conclude that the benefit
ratios are particularly inappropriate as a me-
thod of discussing intergenerational justice.
Unfortunately, it is not always obvious how
Van Parijs reconciles justice between genera-
tions and justice between age groups. One
other problem is the absence of a criterion to
define when the demands of justice start and
end for each age group as the model does not
allow progression of the adult age group
through time. Besides, the author does not
explain how the demand from current gene-
rations to bequest an at least as high produc-
tive potential could constrain the demand to
ensure to all and as much as possible the
rights and means allowing them to pursue the
realization of their conception of what a suc-
cessful life is. 
Professor Bichot’s article on pensions contests
the use of indirect reciprocity to evaluate the
dues and payments that each age group
should receive from and provide others with.
Citing a study by Marcilhacy (2009) aimed
at assessing the level of reciprocal transfers, he
evaluates that the benefits and expenses de-
voted to younger generations (infants and
children) are much larger than what pensio-
ners will receive from them by a ratio possibly
as high as four. The benefits that are taken
into account to calculate what children have
received from their parents seems however re-
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